The work of Bellah et. al. opens up the possibility of an entry point into a discussion on the significance of theonomy versus a communitarian approach to the apparent secularisation of society. Bellah and others interpret this move towards secularity as resulting from a shift in society from drawing upon past traditions, in particular the traditions they identify as the Biblical tradition and the Republican tradition in favour of a new paradigm that emphasises the self interest of the individual. This latter paradigm does have some affinity with the tradition they call the Utilitarian Individualist tradition, a tradition that takes as given certain basic human appetites and fears and sees human life as an effort by individuals to maximise their self interest relative to their given needs. However they do not appear to be particularly impressed with the tradition they claim has arisen in opposition to the Utilitarian Individualist, a tradition they identify as Expressive Individualist. Expressive Individualism is perceived as holding that each person has a unique core of feeling and intuition that should unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be realised. They claim that those who support the Expressive Individualist position hold that:

"This core of feeling though unique, is not necessarily alien to other persons or to nature. Under certain circumstances, the expressive individualist may find it possible to "merge" with other persons, with nature, or with the cosmos as a whole. Expressive individualism is related to the phenomenon of romanticism in the eighteenth century European and American Culture. In the twentieth century it shows affinities with the culture of psychotherapy."

The affinity of the above description of Expressive Individualism with the attributes of autonomy as identified by Tillich in particular, but also with the description of autonomy found in Kohlberg and Fowler suggests that Bellah et. al.'s Expressive Individualist tradition is concerned with the category of autonomy that we have considered as the antithesis to heteronomy. If this is so then the category of autonomy is a significant factor in modern America (and Australia) and cannot be dismissed by the church in its outreach to the surrounding culture, as indeed the church cannot ignore the significance of the new paradigm of self-interest also identified by Bellah et. al. In Australia, eighteenth century romanticism can also be claimed as an influence on present day culture, just as much as as Bellah et. al. claim it to be on European and American culture.

The research and its methodology of the social scientists that made up Bellah's team is such that it cannot be easily dismissed. Their method of interviewing such a significant number of individuals and categorising them into four easily handled and identifiable traditional expressions gives to their research an authenticity that cannot be ignored. Their research has provided an extremely useful tool for analyses of American society and because of their extensive use of the interview method they have provided valuable insights into the thinking processes of modern day Americans. However their preferred option, when addressing the question, "How ought we to live"? is the formation of a movement to be the successor of the civil rights movement. Such a movement's aim would be to transform the social ecology of the American Nation in much the same way as the environmental movement aims to change the environmental ecology of the world. They see this social ecology movement as leading to changes in the relationship between the government and the economy. Much of what is advocated in Habits of the Heart concerns a return to the old ways. The authors have an undisguised bias towards the efficacy of the currently less influential traditions of the biblical and republican genre, and seek to recapture some of the strengths associated with these traditions.

They speak specifically of, "a return in a new way to the idea of work as a contribution to the good of all and not merely as a means to one's own advancement," "the split between private and public, work and family, that has grown for over a century, might begin to be mended," "a recovery of the older notions of the corporation,"reappropriating tradition," and " a restored social ecology might allow us to mitigate the harm that has been done to disadvantaged groups without blaming the victims or trying to turn them into carbon copies of middle-class high achievers." Admittedly all of these aims are admirable, and in a society that is beginning to question the high level of insecurity that is present within say, Australian society as evidenced by the content of numerous counselling interviews undertaken by my partner and myself as counselling practitioners attest, the ever increasing length of hours that those who have employment are being asked to work, accompanied by the difficulty such employees are experiencing in finding adequate time to nurture their relationships with partners and children. However, the probability of a general and voluntary commitment of citizens, corporations and government to restored social ecology would appear to be very slight indeed.

Bellah et. al. acknowledge that the current emphasis on self-interest has a strong economic base. Given that the recent conference in Kyoto, Japan at which the European nations were hoping to achieve consensus on reducing greenhouse gasses by 20% by 2010 found such difficulty in arriving at a consensus because of economic factors-Australia even arguing on economic grounds for an increase in emissions-it is difficult to imagine that a social ecology which has to not only to stop, but reverse the momentum gained by the disciples of the Chicago School of Economics and its founder Milton Friedman would have much chance of success. The increasing trend toward secularity-interpreted as atheistic in import-of Western democracies would also appear to mitigate against such an event.

Given the affinity between Utilitarian individualism and the Chicago's School of Economic's aims, both in self-interest and economy policy, an argument that aimed at deflecting the current direction of the Expressive Individualist tradition, a tradition in opposition to Utilitarian Individualism, would most likely achieve the worthy aims of Bellah et. al. without significantly compromising their purposes. I acknowledge that there is some significance in the argument that:

"autonomy, valuable as it is in itself, is only one virtue among others and that without such virtues as responsibility and care, ... autonomy itself becomes...an empty form without substance."

Such an argument is expounded forcibly by Paul Tillich. However autonomy only becomes a thing of no substance when divorced from heteronomy it degenerates into a demonic autarchy. This autarchy has strong elements of self-interest that refuse to acknowledge the value of insights arising from communities of memory and as a consequence from traditional values. The rational individual is seen as being the measure of all things worthwhile. Lost in a world lacking coherence-a sense of fragmentariness is a characteristic of high intellectual culture-the highly rational person needs to embrace the wisdom found in Habits of the Heart:

"What we find hard to see is that it is the extreme fragmentation of the modern world that really threatens our individuation; that what is best in our separation and individuation, our sense of dignity and autonomy as persons, requires a new integration if it is to be sustained."

The authors of Habits of the Heart are surely correct in agreeing with Matthew Arnold that we are;

"Wandering between two worlds, one dead,

The other powerless to be born."

However such "necessary" birth would be even more impotent if perceived as a reincarnation of the past. What is needed is to unleash the power inherent in the process of synthesisation. Should the one-dimensional concentration on economics as a total science be generally seen as the pseudo-religion that it really is, with the market maximiser as the paradigm for the human person and competition as the essence of human endeavour, then hopefully theonomy as the rational synthesis of heteronomy and autonomy may once again find expression in Western democracies.

Bellah et. al. are conscious that recently:

"one way of posing the argument about how to deal with the problems emerging in this new form of society has been to pit philosophical liberals against communitarians; Habits of the Heart was often termed communitarian."

If their description in The Good Society of philosophical liberals is rather far

reaching;

".. philosophical liberals are those who believe that all our problems can be solved by autonomous individuals, a market economy, and a procedural state,.."

then their description of communitarians appears to be structured to approximate

their stance,

"communitarians believe that more substantial ethical identities and a more active participation in a democratic polity are necessary for the functioning of any decent society."

Labelling does not sit easy with an approach that is also informed significantly by existentialist conceptions, however for the sake of clarity, the theological and philosophical stance followed in this work with its dependence on Tillich, Kohlberg and Fowler must of necessity be described as leaning more toward the liberal philosophical category than towards the Biblical and Republican tradition that Bellah et. al. favour. The desirability of the restoration of cultural theonomy contradicts the assumption that all our problems an be solved by autonomous individuals. Certainly a market economy such as that sought by the Chicago school of Economics would be anathema to a theonomous understanding of culture, and a purely procedural state would contrast with the strong adherence to democratic principles inherent in theonomy. It therefore follows that a substantial ethical identity and republican participation in democratic polity identified by Bellah et. al. as communitarian would not necessarily be in conflict with theonomy. However, a Biblicalist tradition as described by Bellah et. al. would, in terms of a wider culture provide something of the heteronomous element within theonomy.

From a theonomous stance, the autonomous person is not the measure of all things, but rather enters into a state of second naivety, and allows the traditions of the community of memory to inform her or his values and beliefs. Bellah et. al. emphasise the importance of institutions throughout The Good Society. Institutions, although of necessity ambiguous, certainly have their place. Indeed, recognition of the value of the institutions of marriage and the church was instrumental in identifying the problem of ministry that has given rise to this work. The importance of McIntosh's understanding of the word "practise" has already featured in this work. The quotation above on autonomy as an empty form is preceded in The Good Society by the following: "The classical liberal view...by imagining a world in which individuals can be autonomous not only from institutions but from each other" is one that will find no support in this thesis. Mary Douglas was no doubt correct when she maintained that:

"the most profound decisions about justice are not made by individuals as such, but by individuals thinking within and on behalf of institutions."

The church as institution however tends toward encapsulating Christianity within an ecclesiology. A culture that has in the past suffered from the domination of an established church, whether that church be the Church of England in England or the quasi established Congregational church of early New England, endorses the separation of church and state. However, if the institutionalised church had been seen as the servant of Christianity, and not so indelibly identified with the Christian religion, so that Christianity has become the church, then the tyranny of an established church would have lacked power.

Bellah et. al. in the chapter on the Public Church appear to make the mistake that the number of regular church goers or members is synonymous with the degree of influence Christianity exerts on its surrounding culture. The segmentation of the university into various disciplines is seen by Bellah et. al. as unfortunate, and part of the whole segmentation of society. But have they not also been caught up, as social scientists into the criteria of sociology, conceiving the influence of the church in terms numerical? As we have seen, Tillich as a theologian envisages the Spiritual Community, of which the church is only a part, as being of significant influence in the wider community. The value of the Spiritual Community is that it is not subject to the ambiguity of the churches, having no sociological form. The endorsing of Mary Hatch's-a distinguished young theologian and outspoken churchwoman- radical cultural critique in the chapter on the public church has led to an endorsing of Hatch's recommendation of the development of the basic Christian communities of Latin America.

Hatch is quoted in The Good Society as considering that, "the church ought to form its worship and liturgy around waking people up and getting them moving in the spirit instead of putting them to sleep with a thirty-minute lecture..."

Hatch's description of a basic Christian community in an American context is as follows:

"you get people together in an adult education group in a local church or seminary class, and you begin to go around the group, naming one's oppression, naming what one is suffering or struggling with. Student's will talk about being the son of an alcoholic parent, about coming from a very poor, working class family and being the first one to have gone to college and made it and thus belonging to neither world; or a woman will talk about being divorced, or returning to school in midlife and finding that she and her husband don't know how to live inside their marriage anymore, being equalised yet not equal. Then you read some Scripture together and look for the common ground of meaning that they share. That's a kind of "basic Christian community" model."

 

Such a community involves,

"Public confession and Bible study, seminar and psychodrama, moral conversation and social analysis; the intertwining of biblical, personal, and social texts offers a taste of religious community that is at once pastoral, prophetic, and sacramental: it's shared confession, if you will, but also narrative ethics in the sense that one puts oneself in a broader context and comes to see how one is caught in a web that binds us all. It names sin institutionally as well as personally, so we can resolve to change institutions and not just say, "I'm guilty, forgive me, and next time I'll try to do a little better." "Thus each person's story is part of "our story" told within a community. It is also a story of the social world we share, and the social institutions, relations, and practices that enable or frustrate our flourishing."

 

Hatch also correctly describes the basic Christian community model as saying much about how to live as a community, and perhaps needs to take seriously her assertion that the model describes living as a community in a very different society than ours. Its in the translation across cultures where such a model can run into trouble. The above quotation of a vision of a Westernised basic Christian community also appears to have misunderstood oppression across class boundaries as well. It reads as though a middle class person is trying, unsuccessfully, to empathise with what she perceives as working-class oppression. An earlier suggestion on the same page to look at an Alcoholics Anonymous model seems to be even wider off the mark. Without extensive research it is not possible to authorativly state the strengths and weaknesses of the A.A. approach. However, the experience of counsellors in Joan Spencer & Associates, Counselling Practitioners, is that those clients they counsel who are attached to A.A. appear to be trapped in a co-dependent relationship and do not seem to be empowered from the viewpoint of the individualist therapeutic tradition, to develop their unique core of their being.

Suggestions that the model of worship in the black church has much to offer, also suffers from cross-cultural difficulties. The popularity, particularly in the past of spiritual songs, written by white men trying to capture something of the dynamic of the black church, known perhaps offensively today as "Negro" spirituals, appealed in some circles, but now largely is a phenomena of the past. In similar fashion black worship can appeal across cultures, but it does not seem to be lasting in terms of an alternative form of worship. It would seem that in matters of religion, religious practices of whatever form need to be tied at least historically, if not culturally if they are to have lasting, and wide-reaching effect. A former principle of the Congregational Theological College in Victoria, Dr. Harold Leatherland, used to claim that the Congregational Church in Australia, had historically had difficulty in establishing itself in any significant way because there was no Established Church in any official sense for it to be dissident from, as was the case in England. After a time, even cultures as historically linked as the United States and England can experience difficulty when religious practices are transferred across cultures. Norman H, Murdoch, professor of history at the University of Cincinnatti, has identified the form of historic Salvation Army evangelism as being identical with those methods used by the American revivalists that visited Britain during the 1840's. It was at one of their meetings that the Founder of The Salvation Army, William Booth, then a 16 year old lad was "saved." Booth had thought that these methods held the key to the salvation of the masses, but as Murdoch notes, while conversions took place, those saved, did not stay to form Salvation Army corps, and that, in fact it was in upper working class and middle class areas, where corps were formed out of converts from other denominations. It was Booth's ability to change methods when after a while they failed, that led to the survival of the Salvation Army until it adopted its unique form of the social gospel. Of particular significance, has been the failure of the Salvation Army from its inception to successfully establish itself in any significant way in any Western countries that were culturally Catholic. The Individualist, Biblical and Republican traditions appear to be a necessary prerequisite for growth of the Salvation Army in Western democracies. As the church spread across Europe, cathedrals and church buildings were established on formerly sacred ground, pagan festivals were incorporated into Christian religious festivals. In England, the individualist mythology found in the Druid religion was identified with individualist paradigms in the gospel, and in the development of the native English church concepts of equality and anti-hierarchical developments. Such mythology flourished until the capitulation of the English church to Rome in the eighth century, and may well have played a part in the English reformation. Abbey's tended to have more than one Abbot, who appear not to have taken on the hierarchical role of Abbots under the Roman system, but were rather something like modern day spiritual directors. Changes in the form of worship and liturgy would seem to achieve a greater chance of permanency if they grow out of the historical "home" culture rather than be transplanted from alien societies.

Hatch seems to extend worship across educational bounds to include seminary classes and educational groups in churches. Such a group, offers "a taste of religious community that is at once pastoral, prophetic, and sacramental." This extension of the significance of worship beyond the bounds of the church service as an element of church life to other elements of church can be observed in the Congregational Church's practise of extending the concept of worship across administrative bounds to include the governing action of the Church meeting. The difference between Congregational practice and that which Hatch proposes appears to be that hatch actually diminishes the significance of worship, and in particular the preaching of the Word in favour of her educational groups. In a Catholic tradition, such as that found in Latin America, this aspect of the base Christian community may present no challenge, as they appear to compensate for the diminished role the sermon has traditionally held in Catholic circles. However, in cultures such as those present in the United States and in Australia, in which the Biblical tradition has historic prominence, the downgrading of the preaching of the Word would undermine much that is important in that tradition.

Cardenel's description of the communitarian approach does appear to be concentrated in groupings that are essentially educational. In this sense they offer the possibility of supplementing the sermon in both Catholic and Protestant environments. I doubt however, that universally such groups would have the enthusiastic following that is apparent in Cardenel's writings. A prerequisite for such groups would appear to be a widely shared sense of be oppressed by authority figures or institutions. The Market economy has produced oppressive conditions in Modern Western democracies, however, oppressive conditions identified by counsellors in the private practice mentioned above, do not produce an increased adherence to institutions that are concerned with protecting workers against institutional oppression, such as the Trade Union movement, but rather the emphasis seems to be directed towards the supposed ability of the individual to enter into contracts with institutions, and thus for the individual to protect his or her rights. No cognisance appears to be taken of the unequal relationship, both in resources, knowledge and power, between the individual and the institution, but rather, resting on the myth (in the sense of falsehood) the assumption is that the individual has the power to be the measure of all things, and is able to enter into such contracts with equity. Provided it is accepted that such a trend exists, then it is unlikely, at least in the forseeable future, for the communitarian approach to have much appeal in modern Western democracies.

Another consideration, with regard to the transferability of communitarian church life into Western democracies is that offerings presented as alternatives to "traditional worship," often have a distinct element of the gimmick. It could be argued that Hatch's admonition of the adoption of characteristics of the basic Christian communities is also subject legitimately, to accusations of gimmickry. Worship and church practice must be amenable to changes at the edges as times change. However, "sea changes" such as that proposed by Hatch can only cause unnecessary disturbance within the institution of the church, an increase in the church's ambiguity, and all for a supposed, but unproven benefit.

It could, of course be argued that the Latin American Culture is not so different from Northern American or Australian Culture. Not only are both cultures "multicultural," but in the instance of Northern American culture, the closeness geographically to Latin America and the influence of immigration, legal and illegal, from that area has tempered the European aspects of American culture so much that "alien" is no longer applicable. This may be so, but it is nonetheless beyond the resources of this distant observer of American culture to definitively ascertain. However, if it can be shown by reference to Cardenel's four volume, The Gospel in Solentiname, that for instance, the four traditions that Bellah et. al. have cited as central to an understanding of American society, are also shared by the basic Christian communities he describes, then the argument against the transferability of practise of such communities, even if the above considerations are taken into account, is diminished. If it can be also shown that the Biblical and Republican traditions underpin the value base of the basic Christian communities described by Cardenel, then the accusation levelled at Belah et. al. that their approach is communitarian can be largely substantiated. On the assumption that the categories of heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy are relevant to the four traditions that Bellah et. al. describe, then such an exercise could also be useful in determining if indeed the concept of the Base Christian Community's "communitarian" Bible study technique is neither heteronomous or autonomous but rather theonomous. Another consideration might be that the phenomena so unique that it fits into neither of the these categories. In the event that the latter was so, then the lack of universality of Tillich's categories would place them and the usefulness of this thesis is in doubt.

On the other hand, if it can be shown that Cardenel's communities are theonomous, and at the same time the bearers of the Biblical and Republican traditions as described by Bellah et. al., then some form of merger between the Expressive Individualist tradition and the Biblical and Republican traditions would need to be evident in order for the category of the autonomous to be present. Given Bellah et. al.'s rejection of the Expressive Individualist position, as the way forward, a preliminary observation can be made that if the Cardenel's basic Christian communities can be described as bearers of the Biblical and Republican traditions, then they, without making provision for the Expressive Individualist position, cannot be theonomous. If, on the other hand they are not adequately described as just being composed of Biblical and Republican tradition, but rather are theonomous, then Bellah et. al. cannot be described as communitarian in the sense that Cardenel's communities were. The second sense that Bellah et. al. use the concept of individualism entails a belief in the primary reality of the individual, whereas society is seen as second-order, a derived or artificial construct. Bellah and others call this view ontological individualism. This concept of society as an artificial construct relieves the individual of the obligation as an individual to regard society as being a primary reality or as a consideration that takes precedence over the individual. A notion that views society as being as real as individuals excludes, or at least severely limits the possibility of the individual acting in a purely autonomous way with regard to society. Bellah et. al. state that ontological individualism, which is shared by both Utilitarian and Expressive Individualist traditions, is opposed to the concept of social realism, the view that society is as real as individuals, a belief that is common to Biblical and Republican traditions. Whereas it is within the tradition of Expressive Individualism that the autonomy of the individual is given its most developed expression as autonomy as such, within the confines of the traditions identified by Bellah et. al., it is not possible to describe theonomy as a synthesis of heteronomy and autonomy without taking this consideration into account. Therefore working within the parameters of Belah et. al., neither the Biblical or Republican traditions alone or in concert meet the criteria in themselves to be viewed as theonomous. That is not to exclude them as possibly being a necessary criteria, but in themselves alone or together, they are not sufficient to be designated as theonomous If they in  themselves do not meet the criteria for a theonomous expression of cultural life, can the Republican and Biblical traditions be designated as belonging to either of the other two categories? The same argument that excluded them from being theonomous also applies to autonomy. As mentioned above, only by accommodating the expressive tradition, could they be considered autonomous. But even then, elements of heteronomy would be present. This only leaves the option of heteronomy, unless they are perceived as constituting an expression of culture not encompassed by Tillich's categories. Bellah et. al. do identify individualist forms of Christianity with the Biblical tradition, however individualism is itself a necessary aspect of, but not sufficient of itself to be designated as autonomous. Just as various psychological development theories aim at be all-embracing, this is not always necessarily so. Carol Gilligan, with her ethic of responsibility postulates a morality that challenges Kohlberg's moral development schemata. I have interviewed in recent years, male clients who certainly appear to follow Gilligan's ethic of responsibility, rather than Kohlberg's stages, just as I have over the years interviewed women who easily accommodate Kohlberg's stages and give little credence to Gilligan's ethic. If this can happen in the realm of moral development, it is quite possible that there are people and institutions that do not fit readily into Tillich's categories. There are for instance, the specific principles relating to justice and the seeking of the public good that are central to the Republican tradition, that in the light of Kant's principled categories could indicate an autonomous orientation in this tradition. The broadness of the Biblical tradition could also allow for autonomous elements. Existentialists will not be surprised at the resistance of groups to fit pre-determined categories. As in human psychological development there are transitional stages, so too, it is likely that traditions also might exhibit the ambiguity associated with movement in the development of the tradition from one category to another. I have envisaged the incorporation of the Expressive Individualist tradition into the Republican tradition as one such possible movement. Nevertheless for the sake of clarity, within the confines described by Bellah et. al. it would appear the neither Republican or Biblical tradition is autonomous or theonomous.

But what of the community at Solentiname, the community of campesino's that lived on the remote archipelago on Lake Nicaragua described by Cardenel? The four volumes of The Gospel in Solentiname provide an almost continual verbatim account of Bible Studies that were held each Sunday morning, and as such give a unique insight into the thinking of the community and the influence that the church had on that community.

The Communist ideology appears to have informed their understanding of the gospel. It also engendered an exclusion of those who for various reasons were uncomfortable either with the ideology or whose spiritual needs were not being met. Cardenal reports that,

"Not all those who lived on these islands came to Mass, many because they had no boat, and others because they missed the devotion to the saints, to which they were accustomed. Others stayed away through the influence of anti-communist propaganda, and perhaps also through fear."

The community and the Campesinos of whom it was composed were suffering under an oppressive Capitalist regime. Jesus was for them the Liberator that would save them from this oppression. Is it possible to identify Bellah et. al.'s traditions operating in this community? The first impression on reading The Gospel of Solentiname is the significant differences between the Campesinos in Nicaragua, and the people of the United States of America. Whereas the four traditions that Bellah et. al. address arose partially in reaction to conditions in Europe prior to the colonisation of that area of Northern America now known as the United States of America, the history of the community of Solentiname is such that the contrast could hardly be greater. The Campesinos of Nicaragua are not the descendants of colonists, their forbears did not possess the history that set the scene for the development of the traditions in the United States. Since colonisation and missionary activity in Nicaragua the Campesinos have been Catholic, whereas, at least initially, the American colonies consisted of dissenting and Protestant Europeans. Certainly in Nicaragua, as a result of perceived oppression and the collaboration between the church and the state, there has arisen a form of Protestantism, that has sought as a means of defence a form of consciousness raising that is Marxist in origin. Socialist ideology pervades the pages of the Gospel of Solentiname, however there is a significant admission that Communism has not absorbed Christianity, but rather that Christianity has absorbed Communism. Such a social milieu does not readily yield insights into the existence of and effect of historical sociological traditions such as those identified in the United States of America. One would expect to find traditions of a different kind, given the history of these people. There has obviously been a strong traditional approach to Catholic worship in the past and there is a resistance among the older generation to changes in the liturgy that has arisen because of the imposition of the "communitarian" approach. Ernesto Cardenal is recorded as saying,

"But we mustn't blame people who live in this traditional religion because this is what they've been taught. I'm thinking of my parents, who are very good people, but they've been taught this and they've known nothing else."

This strong Catholic tradition appears to have inhibited any sense of the individual,

as prior to society, rather the individual is subsumed into an organism, a plant:

"And if we're a single organism, we live only if we're united to others, to separate us is to kill us. A Guevara girl: "Humanity is the plant of love.""

The people of Solentiname appear to be heirs to the myth of community in much the same way as the Near East also adhered to this myth. The Gospel readings that were shared in the community at Solentiname were initially addressed to a people who basically shared the same myth. No wonder this "communitarian" Bible study was so readily accepted. The ready acceptance of the collective within these communities remains unchallenged by the contra myth of the individual. Consequently, search as one may, there can be found nothing here of Utilitarian Individualism, except in the sense that such a tradition underpins much of the Capitalism of the governing authorities of Nicaragua, and if understood by the community would be opposed.. Lacking the penetration of individualism, the essential precursor for Expressive Individualism is absent, consequently one would look in vain for a consciousness of such a tradition. Ironically, the latter tradition, because of it affinity with psychotherapy is also, like socialism, also dependent on consciousness raising, as indeed is the Gospel.

There could, perhaps be something of the theonomy Tillich identified in pre-Socratic society in ancient Greece within the community at Solentiname, but without knowing specifically what elements in pre-Socratic society Tillich was alluding to, it is difficult to determine whether this is so. The Republican tradition with its sense of motivation by civic virtues as well as self interest appears to be present in Cardenel's Solentiname. The people who participate in his Bible Study do have a strong sense of civic virtue. The public participation in the Bible Study is a form of moral education and concern with justice and the public good as required by the Republican Tradition. Participation in public life has affinity with theonomy. However the community at Solentiname is still the church, and as the church it is,

" a social group immersed in the conflicts of existence, and as such, is subject to an irresistible temptation of becoming heteronomous and suppressing autonomous criticism. As a consequence the church elicits strong autonomous reactions which are often strong enough to secularise not only the culture, but itself as well."

Tillich values highly the Catholic Substance as perceived in the sacraments, rituals and symbols of its worship. His concept of the ideal church as displaying a combination of Catholic Substance and Protestant Principle must of itself suggest that such a church were it possible to exist would constitute an essential element of a theonomous church. The iconoclasm of the Solentiname community raises concern, particularly in relation to the possibility that this community might be termed as theonomous.

"We used to do what we were told; we'd come with the candles and this or that and we didn't understand, right? And as our parents taught us that, we had to do what they did. Now we've discovered a new law. I understand all that. I see that the old law that our parents had, we had to follow, because it was the one our parents taught. But now a law has come that is quite different, so now we have to obey another law. Not keep the same one, because that's wrong."

In a theonomous community one would expect to find some indication of that which Tillich calls the Spiritual Presence. Tillich says that the Spiritual Presence removes injustices of the law by fighting against the ideologies which justify them. No one could accuse the community at Solentiname of not fighting against the ideology of the Somoza government in Nicaragua. As one reads through the record of the Bible studies at Solentiname an impression is given that they were building up to a kairos event. There are just small hints here and there such as the comment of the young man at the end of the above quotation. In speaking of Mary, the mother of Jesus, he says, "She spoke for the future, it seems to me, because we are just barely beginning to see the liberation she announces, and the statement of Cardenal, "We knew that the hour of sacrifice was going to arrive. This hour has now come." Tillich says of a community waiting for the Kairos that,

"The consciousness of Kairos in the sense of an emerging theonomy creates a community of those who are filled with the same import and who strive for the same goal. It is a community of those who hear the call of the Kairos and understand themselves in it."

One can say of the community at Solentiname that it was a community that was certainly ambiguous. Perhaps its ambiguity was that, although informal, it nevertheless possessed structure. Just as the church itself must remain ambiguous, so must Solentiname. It is only in the Spiritual Community that has no structure that an unambiguous theonomy can possibly be identified.

Earlier in this chapter it was stated that, given Bellah et. al.'s rejection of the Expressive Individualist position, as the way forward, a preliminary observation can be made that if the Cardenel's basic Christian communities can be described as bearers of the Biblical and Republican traditions, then they, without making provision for the Expressive Individualist position, cannot be theonomous. Although there are similarities with pre-Socratic culture which Tillich describes as theonomous, and although they are biblical in the sense of participating in Bible studies, the community is not a bearer of the Biblical Tradition as understood in American culture. It can be claimed that the Solentiname community show characteristics of the Republican Tradition, and so, as a consequence, lacking the autonomy of the Expressive Individualist tradition it can hardly be perceived as being Theonomous. The community, having distanced itself from strict allegiance to Catholic polity, and its use of a Protestant translation of the Bible, suggests that the community described in The Gospel of Solentiname can be considered to be at least autonomous.

Throughout this chapter an attempt has been made to show that not only heteronomy but also autonomy, and theonomy also have their place as expressions of faith within Christianity, and that this raises the possibility of the church adopting new ways of being. In the exploration of what this "new way of being" might entail, the thesis, antithesis and synthesis model that Hegel identified would seem to commend itself, as it is out of the conflict that arises between heteronomy and autonomy a new synthesis arises, and that synthesis is theonomy.