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OWNING ONE'S FAITH AND BELIEF

Dissertation by Dr. Bill Spencer

Web Presence sponsored by Joan Spencer & Associates

© 2002 J.S.& A. Pty Ltd.

CHAPTER 4 (a)

 THE INDIVIDUAL AND HETERONOMY, AUTONOMY AND THEONOMY

It is not unusual to speak of an individual as being autonomous. Rarely however is a person spoken of as being heteronomous and even more rarely, if ever, is the word theonomous used in reference to an individual's way of being. Autonomy has been used with reference to states, or societies or cultures since the time of the ancient Greek world, when it was first used to refer to conquered city-states as having been granted autonomy. The term originally referred to the rights of these city-states to govern themselves, mint their own coinage and pass their own laws. These city-states were considered autonomous even though they were dependent still on the city that had conquered them. Today, when autonomy is used in relation to nations, it is generally taken to refer to their sovereignty. The concept of dependency has been removed from the modern concept of autonomy. Were one today to speak of a nation whose relationship to another nation was similar to that of the city states referred to above, the word autonomy would not be used without qualification. The partial autonomy of conquered ancient Greek states, even although they passed their own laws, meant that ultimately they were subject to an alien or strange authority, and as such the word heteronomous could be used of them. Theonomous, used in reference to a state would be seen as unusual, if not rare and might well be mistaken for the word theocratic. However, strictly speaking, theonomy with regard to a state would mean that state acknowledged that the ultimate ethical authority resided in the divine will. As a family of words all bearing "nomos" in common, it is clear that heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy are related to each other. The poverty of the use of the terminology of heteronomy and theonomy in reference to nation states would seem to make their use inappropriate as a means of communication. The same concern applies when this terminology is used of individuals, however heteronomy and

theonomy so adequately identify the conditions of which we speak that despite the paucity of their use in everyday language, they are admirably suited for the purpose of this thesis.

Individuality and autonomy are often used as being synonymous. However the individual can be referred to as being either autonomous, heteronomous or theonomous, in the same way as it is possible to speak of Nation States as having these qualities. To speak in this way of an individual is to address something of the nature of the particular individual, to speak of what it means to be an individual-to exist as a person. Chapter two referred to, and began to address Tillich's use of heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy with reference to individuals. In exploring the terminology of heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy with regard to the individual, we need to ask in the first instance, "What does it mean to be an individual-to exist as a person? In seeking an answer to this question the search will be confined to the use of the word individual made by Paul Tillich, John Macquarrie, Immanuel Kant, Lawrence Kohlberg and James Fowler. These authorities have been chosen because they each discuss autonomy, theonomy and heteronomy with regard to the individual. Some of the authors mentioned above have written volumes on the question of what it is to be a person. The intention in this section is simply to set the scene for the exploration of the relationship of individuality and heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy, not give a complete exposition of each authority's understanding of what it means to exist as a person.

To exist as an individual person includes for Tillich the experience of oneself as being in a world to which one belongs, and in which one participates in everything that is. It is to be caught up in the ambiguities of life, and to find oneself between the opposite poles of individualisation and participation, between the poles of dynamism and form, and the extremities of freedom and destiny. An individual finds the shock of a sense of non-being actually gives her or him the dynamic to resist that non-being and to live. To live requires form and it is this form that non-being endeavours to destroy. To be an individual is to be aware of one's finitude, yet at the same time to seek one's destiny in the infinite. Being an individual person implies being a self-centred being who's centre of self cannot be divided. A person is the perfect form of individualisation and at the same time perfect participation in the sense of communion with others. All this and more is involved in being a person as Tillich understands the term.

Macquarrie understands personal individual existence in a similar fashion to that of Tillich. He too envisages personal existence as found between polarities or tensions. His terminology is sometimes reminiscent of Tillich as well. Included in his understanding of the existent individual are the following. He sees personal existence in terms of the tensions inherent in possibility and facticity, community and individuality, and responsibility and impotence. He sees the individual as a recipient of "disclosure." By this he means that each person has a relation with himself or herself, her or his selfhood. The possibility Macquarrie refers to is the possibility within limits to make decisions. The facticity is shown in the limits that are set. Of individuality and community he says that every existence is someone's own, and each person "looks out upon the world from the point of view of some particular ego." The human individual is also aware of an existential disorder or imbalance in his or her existence. Among these disorders are pride, tyranny and utopianism, all brought about because of the failure to recognise facticity. Other disorders are sensual indulgence, insensitivity to others, despair and the irresponsibility of collectivism.

The previous two authorities were theologians. The next we consider is a developmental and educational psychologist, Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg's emphasis upon the stages of moral development presuppose the individual as intelligent, reflective and capable of development through stage theory. His particular emphasis is upon the individual's capability of sequential development through moral stages. The individual has and is aware of an innate capacity to seek for the moral right.

James Fowler is both a theologian and a developmental psychologist. Included in his understanding of the individual is one who normally can exercise basic trust, and find his or her being in relationships. The human being is able to exercise human faith and imagination. This imagination enables the individual to grasp existence as a whole. Faith is dynamic presumably because of the positive nature of, and real possibility of doubt. The individual realises herself or himself in creativity, and is one who knows more than he or she can express. The individual is able to express and "image" her or his environment by way of metaphors, symbols and concepts.

Robert Bellah et. al.'s approach the individual in terms of their concept of what values the individual should hold. Included in these values is an appreciation of the importance of the institution of the family and other institutions that give people a meaning and a place in the world. They include in their understanding of the individual a division in which an individual can take a utilitarian individualistic perspective on life, or react to that perspective with what they term as empathetic individualism.

Having considered these "potted" interpretations of our authority's understanding of the individual, we turn now to ask what significance does heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy have with regard to being a person for Tillich, Kohlberg, Fowler, and Bellah et al?

The emphasis on culture found in the exposition of Tillich's understanding of heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy is consistent with Tillich's general approach to theology. It was noted however, that Tillich has addressed the situation of the individual under the paradigm of the courage that is required to face life in all its ambiguities and demands. However it is necessary that a revisit be made to the cultural model of Tillich's theology in order to posit authentically his understanding of the individual. The exposition in Chapter three has described Paul Tillich's endeavour to ground the various phenomena of theonomous, autonomous and heteronomous culture into an acceptable theological framework. The general endorsement Tillich gives to an autonomous culture is in direct opposition to the pietist attitude that perceives the modern phenomenon of individualism as antithetical to the teachings of the Christian faith. This reaction can be quite complex because in seeking to dismiss autonomous culture, perhaps even to view autonomous culture as the secular challenge that the church must face and endeavour to diminish, it must wrestle against an occurrence that is multi-faceted. The flow of present-day cultural autonomy is enriched by drawing from a variety of sources. Just as individualism has found expression in various forms since the Enlightenment, so these same phenomena have influenced the cultural expression of autonomy. Tillich claims that one's individuality lies in its creative possibilities. This being so, it must follow that those same creative possibilities must in turn influence the culture and the cultural expression of autonomy.

Autonomy for Tillich appears to be never very distant from his concern for the church and the direction in which he believes should inform the church. Tillich constantly advances the necessity of the church having a proper balance of what he calls Protestant Principle and Catholic Substance. In an ecumenical age in which the emphasis is consistently on affirming that which as separate denominations we have in common, it is refreshing to note that Tillich, who was noted for not only his ecumenical concern with regard to the divisions within the church, but also his passionate espousal of dialogue between different religions, recognised so strongly those aspects of the faith that keep Catholics and Protestants apart. By Catholic substance Tillich meant the holy nature of the sacraments exorcised of any demonic elements. However it is the Protestant Principle that is closest to our concern for autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy.

The "Protestant Principle," mentioned in the previous chapter in the discussion of feminist critiques of Tillich, represented for Tillich the element of doubt in the act of faith, an element which he saw as critical for the community of faith. Doubt that arose out of an individual's integrity was never seen as a negative by Tillich. Not that he saw doubt, nor the critical element in which he saw its origin, as being always present within the community of faith, nonetheless there must always be room within that community for both doubt and the critical element. It is obvious that doubt as such, and the critical element are expressions of autonomy, and that when they are absent within the faith community, that community is suffering a serious deficit. Tillich sees in this Protestant Principle the influence of the prophets, and their prophetic judgement on the church as institution, and on the church's doctrines. It is vitally related to the Cross.

"Criticism and doubt show that the community of faith stands "under the cross," if the Cross is understood as the divine judgement over man's religious life, and even over Christianity, though it has accepted the sign of the cross."

Tillich comprehension of the Protestant Principle gives support to the claim above that one's individuality lies in creative possibilities, and that this being so, it must follow that those creative possibilities must in turn influence that this being so, it must follow

that those same creative possibilities must in turn influence the culture and the cultural expression of autonomy. He says that in this way the dynamic of faith in personal terms is applied to the community of faith. Tillich recognises that this autonomous element within the community puts the community at risk, however he justifies this on the ground that faith should be understood as a risk. Once again there appears to be a certain circularity in Tillich's argument, but circular in the sense of being complete, each element tying into each other, rather than a system that is open ended. He says that it is the risk factor in faith that gives it its dynamic, and that the consequence of this dynamic of faith is the Protestant Principle. Tillich is able to mount a very good argument here, one that is convincing, however there still remains the corollary of the argument that leads to the conclusion that Tillich must consider that faith in those Catholic circles in which there is no Protestant Principle has lost its dynamism. It also guides us to the conclusion that the enthusiasm that can be noticed in some apparently very heteronomous churches is not as a result of true faith. Tillich's emphasis on the Protestant Principle is consistent with the value he places on the Reformation. His insights into the Reformation enables us to gain some further understanding of Tillich's appreciation of the significance of heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy.

Tillich argues convincingly that the Reformation was not individualistic, but an effort to establish a new conformism. Conformism and heteronomy can easily be mistaken for being the same, however this is not the case. Later in this chapter we will be observe that Kohlberg recognises that in both the heteronomous stage of moral development as well as in the autonomous, there is to be found a form of conformism. Tillich also acknowledges a conformism in the present day autonomy of Western culture. Tillich claims that the collectivism of the Middle Ages was undermined by the experience of personal guilt and individual question-asking, however, this did not lead to individualism.

Tillich says of Protestantism;

"in spite of its emphasis on the individual conscience, (Protestantism) was established as a strictly authoritarian and conformist system, similar to that of its adversary, the Roman Church of the Counter-reformation. There was no individualism in either of the great confessional groups. And there was only hidden individualism outside them, since they had drawn the individualistic trends of the Renaissance into themselves and adapted them to their ecclesiastical conformism."

Tillich acknowledges that it is possible to say, and that liberal Protestantism has often said "that the courage of the Reformers is the beginning of the individualistic type of the courage to be as oneself," the form of courage which in the previous chapter the writer has identified with present-day individual autonomy. However, Tillich rightly argues that this is a confusion that has arisen because of the historical, not the immediate, effect of Protestantism. The Reformers themselves appear to be theonomous in their actions. The courage of confidence is the form of courage that Tillich ascribes to the reformers. This courage Tillich discusses under the heading of "the courage to accept acceptance," a form of courage that the previous chapter identified as being by nature theonomous. Tillich says the;

"courage of the Reformers, the courage to be as oneself is both affirmed and transcended. In comparison with the mystical form of courageous self-affirmation the Protestant courage of confidence affirms the individual self as an individual self in its encounter with God as person. This radically distinguishes the personalism of the Reformation from all the later forms of individualism and Existentialism. The courage of the Reformers is not the courage to be oneself-as it is not the courage to be as a part. It transcends and unites both of them. For the courage of confidence is not rooted in confidence about oneself. The Reformation pronounces the opposite: one can become confident about one's existence only after ceasing to base one's confidence on oneself. On the other hand the courage of confidence is in no way based on anything finite besides oneself, not even on the Church. It is based on God and solely on God, who is experienced In a unique and personal encounter."

and again;

"The courage of the Reformation transcends both the courage to be as a part and the courage to be as oneself. It is threatened neither by the loss of oneself nor by the loss of one's world. "

However, this theonomy was destroyed by the heteronomous elements of second generation Protestantism and the personal elements were lost. Tillich claims that, "subjective piety became the bridge of the victorious reappearance of autonomous reason," and Pietism became "the bridge to the Enlightenment." He maintains that with the advent of Pietism and Methodism, and their re-emphasis on personal guilt, personal experience and individual perfection, the personal element in religion came to the fore.

According to Tillich, the Enlightenment did not consider itself individualistic, but rather the Enlightenment meant a conformity based on the power of reason in each individual. However, Pannenberg is of the opinion that it was the Enlightenment that affirmed the individual to be autonomous. The,

"emancipation from traditional authority by (the insistence) on the immediacy of the Christian layman to God...this emancipation did not take place at the Reformation but it was its historical consequence....the individual was affirmed by the Enlightenment to be his own law-giver, to be autonomous."

Tillich appears to be a little ambiguous on this issue for he also says that the;

"Courage to be as oneself, as this is understood in the Enlightenment, is a courage in which individual self affirmation includes participation in universal, rational, self-affirmation. Thus it is not the individual self as such which affirms itself but the individual self as the bearer of reason."

This latter claim by Tillich is not far removed from Pannenberg, if at all.

Tillich's argument that the kind of courage described above must become conformist the moment its revolutionary attack on that which contradicts reason has ceased, does appear axiomatic, and therefor inhibits contradiction.

The enlightenment developed as a reaction to the heteronomy of the cultural expressions that precede it. Its fight was essentially against these heteronomous elements. The present day, being an heir to the Enlightenment, the fight against heteronomy has been largely won. This being the case, it follows that it should be possible to identify conformist movements in the modern world.

Conformism is neutral in the sense that its existence in a society is not necessarily good or bad. It is however open to demonisation, and strangely it would appear as though the critical element in autonomy is less effective against conformism than it is against heteronomy. This is possibly because conformism is more subtle than heteronomy. Whereas heteronomy is by nature aggressive, conformity seems to creep upon an individual who can largely be unaware that his conformism may need the application of his or her critical faculties. Not so, as we mentioned, is this the case with heteronomy.

In answering the question of what Tillich meant by being an individual, we obtained as part of the answer, that being an individual is to find oneself between the polarities of individuality and participation. Tillich would seem to stress that an identification with the pole of individuality to the almost virtual exclusion of the other pole of participation is to be autonomous, whereas an identification with the pole of participation to the almost virtual exclusion of individuality is to be heteronomous. Virtual exclusion is mentioned because, in existence it is not possible to be wholly one or the other. Elements of both need to be there in order to create some form of balance. This is possibly another reason why autonomous people are not so aware of participating in some form of conformism when that is the case. Heteronomy then is to lean heavily toward the pole of participation. "The self affirms itself as participant in the power of a group, of a movement, of essences, of the power of being as such."

The world only becomes actual for the individual through participation by the individual in that part of the world that is present to him or her. The portion of the world that is particularly available to the individual is the community in which he or she finds his or her identity. He or she becomes part of that community. In the collectivity of the community the life of the individual is affirmed and determined by existence and institutions of the group. There is a potential anxiety of losing oneself in the group, however this does not happen because the individual identifies completely with the group. Tillich says that guilt is experienced in the group because it constitutes a deviation from the institutions and rules of the group. The individual finds truth and meaning in the traditions and symbols of the group. He or she does not autonomously doubt the beliefs or mores of the group. Nonetheless, in the group there will be outstanding individuals who become the "bearers of the traditions and leaders of the future." These latter must have the ability to distance themselves sufficiently in order to judge and to change the group. The difficulty here is that this automatically produces individual doubt and personal guilt. Tillich does not identify who experiences the doubt or the guilt. Is the guilt and doubt experienced by the "guilty" or by the "judge"? Whichever it is, Tillich says that the personalisation of religion within the culture itself creates a tension between culture and religion. In Western culture this personalisation of religion is traced back to the prophets and to the question-asking in Greek philosophy. The description above of "being a part" presents a very explicit picture of the heteronomous situation. It reveals the heteronomous situation in both its individualistic and institutional forms. It is apparent that the heteronomous situation has the seeds of its own destruction within it because it does not take account of the polarities of existence. The tragedy of Modern existence, however may be in the opposite situation in which the polarities of existence are ignored; in the autonomous culture. Here the necessity of participation is ignored in the name of the freedom of the individual from all forms.

The thesis, antithesis and synthesis structure, following Hegel, in the concept of individual person as she/he moves toward an increasing adequate way of being ought to be clear from the foregoing. The points of tension have been identified and all that remains is the synthesis itself. However, this synthesis which Tillich calls theonomy is not so easily explained, as it is not as common a condition as heteronomy or autonomy. It is proposed to initially introduce Tillich's understanding of individual theonomy by using his concept of sanctification. This should be a useful bridge, as it will be necessary to first of all explain Tillich's understanding of the holy, and its relation to faith. An explanation of theonomy will eventually lead us to an exploration of Tillich's concept of absolute faith.

The holy is also for Tillich closely associated with faith. Ultimately the courage to accept acceptance, involves the appropriation of an absolute faith, and it is with faith that the significance of the holy becomes most apparent.

We need then to turn again to Tillich, who, in his Dynamics of Faith draws on the concept of the holy in relation to faith. Tillich speaks of the depth dimension of faith, and so leads us into an ontological approach.

Tillich says that ;

"Faith is not an act of any of his (humankind's) rational functions, as it is not an act of the unconscious, but it is an act in which both the rational and the nonrational elements of his being are transcended... It transcends both the drives of the nonrational unconscious and the structures of the rational conscious... Everything that happens in man's personal being can become an object of psychology."

However for Tillich the source of faith is our ultimate concern, and ultimately that concern must rest in God. He goes on to say that he (or she) who enters the sphere of faith enters the sanctuary of life. "Where there is faith there is an awareness of holiness". Tillich's use of holiness is different from the popular use. He says, "What concerns one ultimately becomes holy". In one's ultimate concern Tillich recognises the presence of the divine. To him, this is one of the frustrations experienced by autonomous people. The author who has spent an enormous amount of time struggling with the book he or she has written, becomes aware of a sense of profanation and abuse when that volume is used simply for pleasure and entertainment. Extending Tillich's thought, it could be said that the book and its contents express ultimate concern (as experienced by the author, whether consciously or unconsciously), and a dimension of the holy has been tapped. Tillich applies the same principle to the radically secular philosopher who is asked by a tyrannical power-dictatorial or conformist- to give up his secularism. He says such a person would resist such a demand, and in doing so would "experience the unconditional imperative of honesty up to total self-sacrifice." Clearly Tillich does not restrict the holy to the personal experience of holiness. He sees this meaning of holiness as the "currently distorted use of the word", and calls for its replacement by the original and only justified meaning of the word. He is concerned that "Holy" has become identified with moral perfection, especially in some Protestant groups. He says that, "originally, the holy has meant that which is apart from the ordinary realm of things and experiences" and as a consequence, "It is separated from the world of finite relations". He goes on to explain that is why all religions and cults have separated holy places and activities that are set apart from all other places and activities. The word "profane" in its original sense refers to "remaining before the door of the temple, standing outside the holy" and "resisting self-transcendence". The concept of self-transcendence is intimately related to the holy. He maintains it is not the personal quality that decides the degree of participation but the power of self-transcendence.

"Augustine's great insight in the Donatist struggle was that it is not the quality of the priest that makes a sacrament effective but the transparency of his office and the function he performs. Otherwise the religious function would be impossible, and the predicate of the holy could not be applied at all.....The first ambiguity of religion is the presence of profanised elements in every religious act".

The ambiguities within the holy attest very strongly the Lutheran tradition of Tillich. Images of perfection and sanctification relate to the holy. Tillich identifies the emphasis on the paradoxical character of the Christian life. "Luther's experience of demonic attacks led also to a deep understanding of the demonic elements in life in general, and religious life in particular." Calvinism on the other hand led to a concept of sanctification which, "proceeds in a slowly upward-turning line; both faith and love are progressively actualised. The power of the divine Spirit in the individual increases. Perfection is approached, but never reached." He notes that the original Evangelical Radicals rejected this restriction and reaffirmed the concept of the perfect ones, but paradoxically the character of Christian perfection becomes invisible. Actual perfection however, is demanded and deemed possible. However a problematic develops. In Tillich's words;

In the selected group the holiness of the whole and the saintliness of the individuals are actual, in contrast to the "world," which includes the large churches. Obviously, the situation became rather problematic when the holiness sects themselves became large churches. Then, although the ideal of the unparadoxical holiness of every member of the group could not be sustained, the perfectionist ideal remained in force and produced the identification of the Christian message of salvation with moral perfection in the individual members. Calvinism, with its perfectionist elements (though not perfectionism), has produced a type of Protestant ethics in which progressive sanctification is the aim of life."

Tillich proposes a new conception of sanctification which appears to combine the insights of Calvinism and Lutheranism without the problematic. He does this under the rubric of process, and it consists of "four principles determining the New being as process". This is a process on the way to a maturity that is never attained. The first is the principle of awareness, related to depth psychology, but as old as religion itself and it is "sharply expressed in the New Testament." In recognition of the ambiguities of life, sanctification includes awareness of the demonic as well as the divine. The second principle is the principle of increasing freedom in the process of sanctification. The third involves freedom from the law and by implication includes autonomy as an element of theonomy.

"Specific laws, expressing the experience and wisdom of the past are not only helpful, they are also oppressive, because they cannot meet the ever concrete, ever new, ever unique situation. Freedom from the law is the power to judge the given situation in the light of the Spiritual Presence and to decide upon adequate action, which is often in seeming contradiction to the law.

Being part of a process towards maturity he says of this freedom;

"Mature freedom from the law implies the power of resisting the forces which try to destroy such freedom from inside the personal self and from its social surroundings;"

The third principle is that of increasing relatedness- seen as balancing the principle of increasing freedom. He says that the New Being as process drives toward a mature relatedness. "Sanctification, or the process toward Spiritual maturity, conquers loneliness by providing for solitude and communion in interdependence. He says that the process of sanctification creates a mature self-relatedness in which self-acceptance conquers both self-elevation and self-contempt in a process of reunion with one's self.

"As the process of sanctification approaches a more mature self-relatedness, the individual is more spontaneous, more self-affirming, without self-elevation or self-humiliation."

The fourth principle is the principle of self-transcendence - this involves participation in the holy. Paradoxically, this may not necessarily mean participation in church services. With Luther, he reacts against any law that may demand participation in church services. He acknowledges that Luther created a liturgy for Protestant services, and that the danger of withdrawal from communal services is that it easily produces a vacuum in which devotional life disappears altogether. He nonetheless sees the principle of self-transcendence as the most important thing in the process of Spiritual maturity.

"Perhaps one can say that with increasing maturity in the process of sanctification the transcendence becomes more definite and its expressions more indefinite. Participation in communal devotion may decrease and the religious symbols connected with it may become less important, while the state of being ultimately concerned may become more manifest and the devotion to the ground and aim of our being more intensive."

Although Tillich, both for the individual person and for the church, presents some very disturbing implications with regard to sanctification, it is consistent with an individual endeavouring to live in a state of theonomy. His suggestions as to the nature of sanctification overcome the problematic of perfectionist concepts of sanctification. Both the problems which he addresses and also others such as a tendency of those who claim such perfection to be unaware of the shortcomings in their own lives that are received as injustices by others are surmounted. He preserves the New Testament concept of all of the community being "saints" and that the saint is a justified sinner. The implication that standing by these principles may lead to martyrdom is disturbing. That either self-incurred or church-imposed exclusion from participation in the devotional services of the church is of concern, although to a lesser degree. Nevertheless, this is all consistent with Tillich's understanding of theonomy. The above principle also have significance for the churches and sects that have grown out of the holiness movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Some of these churches are heavily involved in the Charismatic movement. Mainline churches, at least in Australia, are generally reluctant to take a definitive position with regard to the Charismatic movement lest they be seen as fighting against the Spirit. The Charismatic movement has established itself as being a movement that attracts a significant number of people who might otherwise not be attracted to the church. The mainline churches are not unaware of the potential for numerical growth that the Charismatic movement can offer. Secularism has successfully fragmented and compartmentalised modern society so that the church is seen as one option of interest to the individual among many. This differentiation, arising out of the autonomous culture, has meant that to some extent the church has become on of many leisure choices. The entertainment dimension in some Charismatic and alternative worship services, intentionally or unintentionally recognises this fact of modern society. As a consequence it is not likely that in the latter half of the twentieth century, concepts of sanctification as that of Tillich's above would be well received.

Chapter Four Continued at Chapter Four (B)

This page was last updated on the 16th September 2009

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